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1. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) under the leadership of Col Andrew Melnyk is the continuation of an organization of the same name founded in the nineteen-twenties by Col Eugene Konovalets, who was killed in the Netherlands in 1938. It advocates the establishment of a Ukrainian national state through a national revolution. Beginning in February 1940, there has existed a deep split in the OUN between that section which continued to accept the leadership of Col Melnyk and an off-shoot organization which recognized Stepan Bandera as leader of what is sometimes referred to as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Revolutionaries (OUN-R). This split was the result of personal and tactical differences. Col Mykola Soborsky, (fmu) Senyk-"Hrybivsky", and Yaroslav Baranovsky, but not originally Col Melnyk, on the one side were opposed to Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko (or Stecko) on the other side. Moreover, Bandera favored a Ukrainian national revolution against the Bolsheviks in 1940 whereas Melnyk advocated a policy of waiting until the inevitable collision between East and West would take place. In spite of many attempts on the part of OUN, no conciliation with OUN-R has come about since that time.
2. The OUN has not maintained any friendly contacts with the Germans at any time. This claim is contradicted by assertions of many critics of OUN, according to which it enjoyed the support of the Gestapo, whereas the Bandera faction was originally well liked by the German Army and particularly the Abwehr. The Germans first expressed interest in discussing the war situation with Melnyk in 1939. In view of their refusal to discuss Ukrainian aspirations for national independence, Col Melnyk turned a cold shoulder to their overtures. On 5 Aug 41, Melnyk reached an agreement with Taras Bulba, which led to the joint support of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which became the military arm of the Ukrainian independence movement and directed its activities against the Germans and the Soviets alike. Until the present time, the UPA has continued its military resistance to the Soviets, and the political underground movement has supplemented such efforts through less overt non-military activities.

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3. In January and February 1942, a number of Ukrainian underground leaders including Rohach, Mihailo, Teliha, and many others were arrested and executed by the German occupation forces. In November 1942, new arrests of underground leaders took place, and those arrested were moved to the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen and a separate division of the Sachsenhausen camp at Braetz on the Oder. By January 1944, all major Ukrainian underground leaders were apprehended by the Germans. In a last effort to sponsor a united anti-Soviet drive, the Germans released these Ukrainian underground leaders in October 1944. Col Melnyk moved to Berlin, where German officials approached him to request his collaboration against the Soviets. [REDACTED] an official statement by the German Foreign Minister disclaiming any territorial interest in the Ukraine. The German government was still unwilling to tie its hands in this respect, and Melnyk therefore left Berlin and moved to Bad Kissingen (Bavaria), accompanied by Dmytro Andreyevsky and Osyp Boydunyk. 25X1
4. Bad Kissingen was liberated by US troops on 7 Apr 45. One of Col Melnyk's early actions after liberation was to send a cable through [REDACTED] US Army, to US Secretary of State, Edward R Stettinius. This cable was sent on 2 May 45 and expressed satisfaction at the separate representation of the Ukraine at the San Francisco Conference, but protested at Manuilevsky's selection as the Ukrainian representative. In spite of the descending Iron Curtain, OUN-Melnyk has maintained steady contact with the Ukrainian homeland, both with the area which was a part of Poland until 1939 and with the Soviet Ukraine. A "referent" (staff specialist) for domestic questions whose identity only Col Melnyk is authorized to divulge to any outsider is in charge of maintaining contact with the Ukraine through mail, couriers, and certain additional channels which I cannot describe. Even those trusted members of OUN who are in a position to communicate with friends and relatives in the Ukraine have to clear such matters with the competent specialist. Courier service cannot be maintained in wintertime because of the increased dangers of detection of the couriers by Soviet and Satellite security forces. 25X1
5. The latest communications from the heart of the Ukraine to reach OUN [REDACTED] of which copies [REDACTED] were dated 25 Jul 52 and 13 Sep-52, respectively. In these reports of conditions in the Soviet Ukraine, the writers claim that the population not only viewed sympathetically the UPA and political underground movement but extended help to these anti-Soviet nationalist organizations within the narrow limits of possibility. It has to be admitted, however, that these organizations can no longer claim to control any part of the Ukraine as they did for a time in the nineteen-forties. 25X1
6. In addition to Col Melnyk and the specialist for domestic questions, the following leaders of OUN deserve mention. Dmytro Andreyevsky is the specialist for foreign policy; Gen Mykola Kapustyanski is specialist for military matters; and Osyp Boydunyk is specialist for internal political questions (other than contact with the homeland). The OUN leaders are also represented in the Ukrainian government-in-exile, which functions through the Vikonnyi Organ (Executive Organ) and the Ukrainian National Rada in Western Germany. Dmytro Andreyevsky is Vice Premier and Deputy Foreign Minister, and Gen Mykola Kapustyanski, Minister of War in the Executive Organ; Osyp Boydunyk is Vice President of the Ukrainian National Rada.
7. All major Ukrainian exile groups except the Union of Hetmanites-Statists (SHD), a monarchist group, were represented in the Ukrainian National Rada from its inception in June 1948 until the OUN-R (Banderists) withdrew in the spring of 1950. In view of the fact that the government-in-exile has no actual executive but only moral powers which stem largely from its claim to represent all major political groups, no organization has been

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permitted to dominate the Executive Organ or the Rada. The principle of consolidation on the basis of parity has characterized the two organs of the government-in-exile at all times. The Hetmanites have consistently opposed its republican form, and the OUN-R has objected to its allegedly inadequate emphasis upon revolutionary methods in achieving the independence of the Ukraine. (Fnu) Hryhorenko, Minister of Interior in the Executive Organ and a member of the Ukrainian Revolutionary-Democratic Party, has concerned himself with the problem of bringing the SHD and OUN-R groups into the exile government. I doubt whether sufficient concessions, such as awarding key posts to members of these organizations, will be offered to these groups and therefore do not believe that they can be induced to join a united Ukrainian front.

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